Delict in Scotland in 2018 by Hogg, Martin
 
 
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Delict in Scotland in 2018
Citation for published version:
Hogg, M 2019, 'Delict in Scotland in 2018', European Tort Law Yearbook, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 563-588.
<https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/tortlaw.2019.9.issue-1/issue-files/tortlaw.2019.9.issue-1.xml>
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
European Tort Law Yearbook
Publisher Rights Statement:
This is the accepted version of the following article: Hogg, M 2019, 'Delict in Scotland in 2018', European Tort
Law Yearbook, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 563-588, which has been published in final form at:
https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/tortlaw.2019.9.issue-1/issue-files/tortlaw.2019.9.issue-1.xml
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 22. Nov. 2020
 
I. Scotland 
Martin Hogg 
A. Legislation 
1. Prescription (Scotland) Act 2018, asp 15 
1 The negative prescription of obligations - that is, their extinction by virtue of 
the passage of time - is governed in Scots law by the Prescription and Limitation 
(Scotland) Act 1973 (‘the 1973 Act’). Delictual obligations fall within the scope 
of the Act. Over time, a consensus has emerged that the Act suffers from a 
number of defects. To remedy these defects, the Prescription (Scotland) Act 
2018 (‘the 2018 Act’) was passed by the Scottish Parliament. 
2 The 1973 Act applies a short negative prescriptive period of five years to any 
obligation arising from liability (whether arising from an enactment or a rule of 
law) to make reparation.1 A quinquennium thus applies to the duty to pay dam-
ages arising from delictual liability. However, there has been some doubt as to 
whether it applies to other sorts of delictual obligation, apart from the obligation 
to pay damages. The 2018 Act clears up this uncertainty by providing that the 
prescriptive period also applies to ‘any obligation arising from delict, not being 
an obligation falling within any other provision’ of the Act.2 It also amends the 
law by changing the previous references to an obligation to make reparation 
arising from an enactment or rule to law to a more broadly stated ‘obligation to 
pay damages (whatever the source of the obligation)’.3 The more readily under-
stood term ‘damages’ has been adopted in place of the traditional Scottish term 
‘reparation’. 
3 A further terminological change has been effected, in that the words ‘act, ne-
glect or default’ in sec 11 of the 1973 Act have been replaced with the words 
 
1 See the 1973 Act, sec 6 and Schedule 1, para 1(d). 
2 New paragraph 1(da) of Schedule 6, added by sec 1(2) of the 2018 Act. 
3 Amended para 1(d) of Schedule 6, as altered by sec 1(2) of the 2018 Act. Section 11 of 
the 1973 Act is also amended, to the same effect. 
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‘acts or omission’.4 Section 11 is the principal section dealing with when the 
prescriptive period applying to obligations to pay damages is deemed to com-
mence. The reason for this terminological change is twofold: it creates con-
sistency with the language used in a later section of the Act (sec 17), and it 
focuses attention more closely on matters of fact (whether an act or omission 
has occurred) rather than on matters of liability (whether there has been ‘ne-
glect’ or ‘default’) which are irrelevant to whether or not the occurrence of in-
jury or damage could reasonably have been discovered (as required under the 
discoverability test set out in sec 11).  
4 The substance of the discoverability test has itself also been altered by the 2018 
Act: previously the law provided that the quinquennial prescriptive period ap-
plicable to damages could be postponed in cases where ‘the creditor was not 
aware, and could not with reasonable diligence have been aware, that loss, in-
jury or damage … had occurred’, the postponement being to the time when ‘the 
creditor first became, or could with reasonable diligence have become, so 
aware’.5 That provision is amended to add in further requirements beyond the 
creditor simply becoming aware of the fact of the loss, injury or damage: the 
new provision adds the further requirements of the creditor’s awareness of 
(i) the fact that the loss, injury or damage was caused by a person’s act or omis-
sion, and (ii) the identity of the person who caused the loss, injury or damage.6 
It also clarifies that it does not matter whether the creditor was aware that the 
act or omission that caused the loss, injury or damage was actionable at law.7 
These amendments address uncertainties surrounding the previous provisions 
that had troubled the courts for years.  
5 A further amendment in relation to damages claims has been made by sec 8 of 
the 2018 Act. Under the original rules, the time when the absolute prescription 
of damages claims begins to run (the date on which damage occurred) might 
not occur until a considerable period of time after the harmful event occurred. 
The 1973 Act did not address this concern. Section 8 of the 2018 Act does so, 
by introducing a start date for a twenty-year period of long negative prescription 
applicable to damages claims: after the expiry of this twenty-year period, any 
damages claim will be absolutely extinguished, whether or not the damage has 
yet manifested itself. This period runs from either the time on which the act or 
omission occurred (or the last such date, where there was more than one act or 
omission), or else, where the act or omission was a continuing one, the date on 
which it occurred.8 So, when this provision comes into force, there will be no 
possibility of, for instance, a negligently constructed building not manifesting 
damage until thirty years after its construction, and the owner being entitled to 
 
4 2018 Act, sec 5(2),(3). 
5 1973 Act, sec 11(3). 
6 1973 Act, new sec 11 (3A), inserted by the 2018 Act, sec 5(5). 
7 1973 Act, new sec 11 (3B), inserted by the 2018 Act, sec 5(5). 
8 New sec 11(4) of the 1973 Act, inserted by the 2018 Act, sec 8. 
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sue the builder for damages at that stage; the obligation to pay damages will 
prescribe twenty years after the date of the builder’s negligence.  
6 These are the principal changes to the prescriptive rules applicable to delictual 
claims made by the 2018 Act. The Act resulted from recommendations made 
in a 2017 Report of the Scottish Law Commission,9 and is a good example of 
the sort of technical statutory amendment which is done well by Law Commis-
sions but which can, in the absence of such work, be overlooked by legislative 
bodies focused on matters considered by them to be of more pressing public 
need. Sections 15–18 of the 2018 Act (its ancillary provisions) came into force 
on 19 December 2018, with the remainder of the Act to come into force on a 
subsequent date to be appointed. 
B. Cases 
1. Steel & another v NRAM Ltd, Supreme Court, 28 February 
2018, [2018] United Kingdom Supreme Court (UKSC) 13: 
Professional Negligence Claim against Solicitor for 
Negligent Misstatement 
a) Brief Summary of the Facts 
7 The facts of the case are as previously reported in the 2016 Yearbook: the pur-
suers (and respondents), NRAM Ltd, are commercial lenders. They granted 
loan facilities to Headway Caledonian Limited (HCL), a client of the first de-
fender (and appellant), Ms Steel, who was a solicitor. The loan related to HCL’s 
purchase of four commercial premises, in return for which HCL granted a se-
curity over the whole property. In response to a communication by NRAM in-
dicating that they wished to discharge the security in relation to a portion of the 
whole property, Ms Steel replied by an email which she indicated had attached 
to it ‘discharges for signing and return as well as the whole loan is being paid 
off for the estate and I have a settlement figure for that’. In reliance on this 
request, NRAM were misled by Ms Steel into discharging the entire security 
when it ought to have been left in place in relation to two of the units. NRAM 
argued that this error had been induced by Ms Steel’s email, whose contents 
amounted to a negligent misstatement for which she, and the firm by whom she 
was employed (the second defenders), should be held responsible. HCL having 
gone into liquidation, NRAM claimed damages amounting to approximately 
£ 458,000 from the defenders.  
 
9 Scottish Law Commission, Report on Prescription (Scot Law Com No 247, 2017). 
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8 At first instance, the judge held that Ms Steel had owed no duty of care to 
NRAM when she made the erroneous statements because (1) it had not been 
reasonable for them to rely on Ms Steel’s statements without checking their 
accuracy, and (2) Ms Steel could not reasonably have foreseen that they would 
rely on her statements without carrying out such a check. On appeal to the Inner 
House of the Court of Session, the appeal court (by a 2:1 majority) overturned 
the judgment at first instance, and held Ms Steel to have assumed a responsi-
bility in delict to the pursuers in relation to the statements she had made. Ms 
Steel appealed this decision to the Supreme Court.  
b) Judgment of the Court 
9 The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that: (1) a representee is re-
quired to establish that it was reasonable to have relied on a representation and 
that the representor should reasonably have foreseen such reliance; (2) in an 
arm’s length transaction, such as the one in this case, a solicitor owes a duty to 
his/her client but will generally not owe a duty to the other party to the transac-
tion; (3) the Supreme Court would only set aside the evaluation of the judge at 
first instance that it was reasonable for the solicitor not to have foreseen that 
the other party would rely on her representations without first checking their 
accuracy if it was satisfied that that evaluation was wrong; and (4) the evalua-
tion at first instance had been a correct one, and therefore the appeal would be 
allowed and the claim of NRAM against Ms Steel dismissed.  
c) Commentary 
10 In the discussion of this case in the 2016 Yearbook, it was noted that a detailed 
dissenting judgment had been given by one of the judges in the Inner House of 
the Court of Session stating why he believed there to be no grounds for disturb-
ing the decision at first instance that it was not reasonable for the pursuer to rely 
on the representation. That dissenting judgment has been vindicated by this ap-
peal to the Supreme Court. 
11 The decision of the Supreme Court is worthy of note for two reasons. First, it 
reaffirms the well-established rule that solicitors in general only assume a duty 
to advise their own clients, and not the other side in any transaction. There are 
exceptions to that general rule, and the Supreme Court mentions examples of 
cases where an exception has applied: for instance, the New Zealand case of 
Allied Finance and Investments Ltd v Haddow and Co,10 in which a solicitor 
had issued a certificate to the other party falsely certifying the truth of a specific 
matter. In the Supreme Court’s view, the case before it was not such a case, and 
the majority of the Inner House had erred in thinking that it was. While Lady 
Smith in the Inner House had sought to answer the liability question simply by 
asking whether the solicitor had assumed a responsibility to her client (holding 
that the email she had sent indicated that she had), the Supreme Court clarified 
 
10 [1983] New Zealand Law Reports (NZLR) 22. 
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that it is necessary to consider the reasonableness of the purported reliance of 
the party on the other side.  
12 Second, the Supreme Court offers an interesting observation on how the law 
classifies a trial judge’s conclusion that it was reasonable for a party to act as it 
did. Lord Wilson (with whom all the other justices agreed) offered this assess-
ment: 
‘It is not a conclusion of fact. It is a judgement referable to an already established 
fact and, albeit required by law, it is not a judgement about what the law is. So it 
is difficult to pigeon-hole it as a conclusion either of fact or of law or even in my 
view as a conclusion of mixed fact and law. It is, rather, an evaluation …’11 
Having described matters thus, Lord Wilson took the view that the law was 
clear that ‘an appellate court needed to be satisfied that an evaluative conclusion 
of a trial judge was wrong before it could be set aside’.12 Consideration of this 
requirement is absent from the judgments of the majority in the court below, 
who had concluded (wrongly, thought the Supreme Court) that the judge had 
misunderstood the law. Focusing instead on the issue of the judge at first in-
stance’s evaluation, the Supreme Court affirms the correctness of that evalua-
tion. 
13 The approach in NRAM to higher courts’ review of lower courts’ evaluations is 
clear: an error on the lower court’s part is required. However, as will be seen in 
the discussion of the next case, a somewhat different view appears to have been 
taken by the Inner House of the Court of Session, the suggestion being that 
superior courts are freer to interfere in judicial evaluations than they would be 
in other sorts of finding. 
2. Anderson v Imrie, Court of Session (Inner House) 
15 March 2018, [2018] CSIH 14, 2018 Session Cases (SC) 
328, 2018 Scots Law Times (SLT) 717: Liability of Farm 
Owner for Injury Sustained by Child while on the Farm 
a) Brief Summary of the Facts 
14 On 30 June 2003, an eight-year old boy was seriously injured in an accident on 
a farm. The boy had been left in the care of the second defender, Mrs Imrie, 
who occupied the farm together with her husband, the first defender. She was 
caring for the boy, and at the same time looking after her own children as well 
as tending to a horse. Mrs Imrie left the boy unsupervised for several minutes, 
 
11 Judgment of Lord Wilson at para 37. 
12 Ibid. 
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having told him to remain within certain areas of the farm and not to enter other 
areas, including a concreted area used to control the flow of livestock. Left un-
supervised, the boy climbed over a closed gate and entered the concreted area. 
The boy climbed on to another gate, causing it to fall on and seriously injure 
him. 
15 The boy raised an action of damages against Mr and Mrs Imrie on the ground 
that the accident was caused by their failure to take reasonable care for his 
safety. The pursuer argued that the defenders were the occupiers of the farm for 
the purposes of the Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960 (‘the 1960 Act’). 
He claimed that they were in breach of the duties they owed to him under the 
1960 Act and also at common law. At first instance, the judge (having held that 
Mr and Mrs Imrie each qualified as ‘occupiers’ under the 1960 Act) absolved 
Mr Imrie of any liability for the boy’s injuries, on the basis that he was not in 
breach of any duty owed to the boy. Mr Imrie had been working elsewhere on 
the farm at the time of the accident, and there was no evidence to indicate he 
even knew the boy was on the premises. On the other hand, the judge held Mrs 
Imrie liable in damages to the boy, although reduced the amount of damages 
due to him because of a finding of 25% contributory negligence on the boy’s 
part. 
16 Mrs Imrie appealed against the decision of the judge at first instance, arguing 
that: (i) she had not failed in her duty to take reasonable care for the boy; (ii) she 
was not an occupier of the farm for the purposes of the 1960 Act, because there 
was insufficient evidence to show that she exercised the required ‘control’ of 
the premises; and (iii) so far as the requirements of the 1960 Act were con-
cerned, the judge at first instance had been wrong to conclude that the accident 
had occurred due to the ‘state of the premises’ (as required under sec 2(1) of 
the Act). 
b) Judgment of the Court 
17 The Inner House of the Court of Session unanimously refused Mrs Imrie’s ap-
peal. They did not consider it appropriate to reopen the findings of the judge at 
first instance in relation to the facts or to the application of the law to those 
facts. Each of the three judges expressed the reasons for so holding in similar 
but distinct terms: (1) because the judge at first instance had not been plainly 
and obviously wrong in relation to the question of whether Mrs Imrie had 
breached her duty of care (a mixed question of fact and law);13 (2) because the 
judge at first instance had been correct on the merits as a matter of substance;14 
and (3) because, in relation to whether the advantages enjoyed by the trial judge 
in respect of the question at issue placed that judge in such a superior position 
 
13 See judgment of Lord Brodie at para 36. 
14 See judgment of Lord Drummond Young at paras 52, and 70–79. 
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that the appellate court ought not to conclude that the judge had reached the 
wrong decision, it ought not to so conclude in this case.15 
c) Commentary 
18 This decision is of principal interest for the same reason as the judgment just 
considered in Steel & another v NRAM Ltd, that is the judicial exercise of re-
viewing a lower court’s evaluative decision. In this case, that decision related 
to the application of the rule relating to the standard of care required of an oc-
cupier of premises. However, the decision of the Supreme Court in NRAM is 
not referred to by the Inner House of the Court of Session.  
19 When can a superior court overturn a finding of a lower court? This question 
had been considered four years before this decision by the Supreme Court in 
Henderson v Foxworth Investments Ltd16 (cited by the appeal bench in Ander-
son), when Lord Reed had identified error on the judge’s part as the basis of 
justified intervention by the higher court, citing as examples ‘a material error 
of law, or the making of a critical finding of fact which has no basis in the 
evidence, or a demonstrable misunderstanding of relevant evidence, or a de-
monstrable failure to consider relevant evidence’.17 Putting it in a slightly dif-
ferent way, Lord Reed had said that in order to reach a conclusion that a judge 
had been ‘plainly wrong’ it would be necessary for a higher court to conclude 
that ‘the decision under appeal is one which no reasonable judge could have 
reached’.18 
20 The guidance in Henderson had thus been to the same effect as that in NRAM, 
that a lower court’s judgment must be erroneous before it can be overturned by 
a higher court. However, in Lord Brodie’s view, that guidance was inapplicable 
to the review of a judge’s decision as to how legal rules should be applied to 
primary facts, what Lord Brodie called 
‘a question of mixed fact and law, or a question of evaluation of or adjudication 
upon primary facts or, to use the formulation employed by Lord Steyn … “an 
informed opinion by the judge in the light of all the circumstances of the case.” 
…’19 
 
15 See judgment of Lord Malcolm at paras 95, 96, 111 and 115. 
16 [2014] UKSC 41. 
17 Judgment of Lord Reed at para 67. 
18 Judgment of Lord Reed at para 62. 
19 Judgment of Lord Brodie at para 35. 
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Such decisions give rise (argued Lord Brodie) to ‘greater scope’ for higher 
courts to interfere, though the higher court should still attach importance to the 
judgment of the trial judge.20 
21 This approach is hard to reconcile with NRAM. NRAM was also a case about a 
judicial evaluation, and a test of a manifest error was applied by the Supreme 
Court, rather than some test of greater scope. Speaking of ‘greater scope’ to 
interfere is rather vague: how is such greater scope to be determined? Lord Reid 
in Benmax v Austin Motor Co Ltd21 (also cited by Lord Brodie) had argued that: 
‘… in cases where there is no question of the credibility or reliability of any wit-
ness and in cases where the point in dispute is the proper inference to be drawn 
from proved facts, an appeal court is generally in as good a position to evaluate 
the evidence as the trial judge, and ought not to shrink from that task, though it 
ought, of course, to give weight to his opinion’.22 
This suggests a very wide entitlement to interfere, albeit caveated with the 
vague requirement to ‘give weight’ to the lower court’s view. 
22 There is thus some confusion about when higher courts can overturn lower 
courts: is the approach to be applied to reviewing lower courts’ evaluative de-
cisions different from other sorts of decisions? Yes, says Lord Brodie, there is 
a greater entitlement to interfere than in other sorts of decisions; no, says Lord 
Wilson in NRAM. If it is different, what is the extent of the great entitlement for 
review? (Lord Brodie’s suggestion that it is when ‘it is clear that the decision 
in the court below cannot stand’23 is surely the conclusion, not the test.) Lord 
Brodie in fact goes on to express the view that he was not satisfied that the judge 
at first instance had reached a ‘wrong conclusion’,24 and so he appears to have 
applied the very test of error described by Lord Reed in Henderson and Lord 
Wilson in NRAM and not one of any wider scope. The approach of Lord Brodie 
to the matter at hand does not therefore seem to embody the application of any 
‘greater scope’ for interference.  
23 Considering both NRAM and Anderson together, it is hard to discern from the 
cases a clear explanation of the proper approach to the question of when higher 
courts may review an evaluative decision of lower courts. Either the review of 
such evaluative decisions should be subject to an error standard (as NRAM 
seems to suggest) or there should be greater scope for review (as Lord Brodie 
in Anderson appears to suggest) with the grounds for such greater scope in need 
 
20 The opinion of Viscount Simmonds in Benmax v Austin Motor Co Ltd [1955] Law 
Reports, Appeal Cases (AC) 370, 374 was relied upon for this point.  
21 [1955] AC 370. 
22 Lord Reid in Benmax at 376. 
23 Lord Brodie at para 111. 
24 Lord Brodie at para 115. 
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of some clear description. Future resolution of the apparent difference in ap-
proach between these two decisions would be of great assistance to practitioners 
and scholars alike.  
3. Kaizer v Scottish Ministers, Court of Session (Inner House) 
29 May 2018, [2018] CSIH 36, 2018 SC 491 2018 SLT 918: 
Whether Failure of Prison Authorities to Act on a Known 
Threat of Harm against a Prisoner was a Cause of the 
Prisoner’s Injuries 
a) Brief Summary of the Facts 
24 The facts of the case are as previously reported in the 2017 Yearbook: the pur-
suer was an inmate at Aberdeen Prison. He was severely assaulted in the prison 
gym by a second inmate, who was subsequently convicted for attempted murder 
in relation to the assault. The second inmate had previously threatened to assault 
the pursuer. A prison guard, though made aware of this by the pursuer, had 
failed to take any further action. The pursuer sued the defenders as being liable 
for the failings of the prison service. He alleged that they had breached a duty 
to take reasonable care for the safety of those within their prisons, including 
prisoners. The defenders accepted that such a duty rested on them but denied 
that they were in breach of it. 
25 At first instance, the judge (Lord Ericht) held that, on the facts of the case, the 
five requirements laid down by Lord Diplock in Home Office v Dorset Yacht 
Co Ltd25 for establishing the tortious liability of prison authorities (A) for the 
conduct of a prisoner in their care (C) for harm to another (B) had been met. He 
therefore held the defenders liable in damages in an amount to be determined 
at a later hearing. The defenders appealed against this decision, arguing that 
(i) the judge at first instance had erred in holding that, had the prison officer 
reported the threat, the attempted murder would have been avoided; (ii) the pur-
suer had failed to show that it was more likely than not that the attack would 
not have taken place and had failed to demonstrate that, if a report had been 
made, the pursuer and his attacker would have been segregated. 
b) Judgment of the Court 
26 The Inner House of the Court of Session refused the appeal, holding that (1) the 
failure of the prison officer to report the threat made against the pursuer carried 
with it an inference that the absence of a report amounted to a failure to take 
reasonable care for the safety of the pursuer, thereby exposing him to the risk 
of injury; (2) where negligence is established, and the existence of a risk of 
 
25 [1970] AC 1004. 
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injury is demonstrated within the context of a prison setting, a court is entitled 
to make the reasonable assumption that the prison authorities will do something 
about the risk which will reduce it to such a level that it will probably not occur; 
and (3) on that basis, causation could be taken to be established in the absence 
of some extraordinary factor which might make the incident otherwise inevita-
ble despite the taking of reasonable precautions. 
c) Commentary 
27 The reasoning of the appeal bench is of interest for the causal inference which 
the bench felt entitled to make about the counterfactual circumstances which 
would have prevailed had the warning given to the prison officer been passed 
on to his superiors. Such an inference was not strictly necessary, given that the 
appeal bench considered that there had in any event been sufficient evidence 
presented by witnesses to the judge at first instance to support a conclusion that 
the attack would have been avoided had the warning been passed on. Nonethe-
less, the bench felt entitled to make it.  
28 The basis for this inference was the court’s view that it was entitled to assume 
that, if a threat had been reported to the prison management, appropriate steps 
would have been taken to ensure that the threat was neutralised: specifically, 
that the two prisoners would not have been left without appropriate supervision 
while in the gym, thereby preventing the attack. That might well be the case, 
though it is noticeable that no consideration was given as to whether, despite 
such preventative steps being taken, an attack might have been attempted at 
some later point, in a different part of the prison. Such an eventuality might 
have been too fanciful to undermine the causal enquiry into the attack which in 
fact took place, but it would have been helpful for this to have been the subject 
of remarks from the bench.  
29 The legitimacy of the court making this sort of causal inference is somewhat 
questionable, given that the requirement of establishing a causal connection be-
tween wrongful act and harm rests upon the pursuer. However, in this case the 
counterfactual hypothesis concerning the specific attack (that no attack would 
have occurred, had the warning been passed on) was supported by actual wit-
ness testimony, so the conclusion reached by the appeal bench seems correct on 
the facts of the case. 
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4. Bowes v Highland Council, Court of Session (Inner House) 
5 June 2018, [2018] CSIH 38, 2018 SC 499, 2018 SLT 757: 
Whether Conduct of Driver of Vehicle amounted to 
Contributory Negligence in Respect of Claim against 
Local Authority for its Negligence in not Adequately 
Maintaining a Bridge 
a) Brief Summary of the Facts 
30 On 2 February 2010, at around 10am, Mr Bowes was driving his Toyota pickup 
truck on a road near the north coast of Scotland. While travelling across a 
bridge, the vehicle crossed from the westbound to the eastbound lane, collided 
with the parapet of the bridge and fell into the water. Mr Bowes was unable to 
escape from his car and he drowned. His partner, parents, children, and sisters 
sought damages from the defender, the roads authority responsible for main-
taining the bridge.  
31 At first instance, the pursuers founded on the defender’s alleged failure at com-
mon law, as the roads authority responsible for managing and maintaining the 
bridge and its parapets, to take reasonable care for the deceased’s safety whilst 
crossing the bridge. Specifically, it was alleged that the defender, knowing prior 
to the accident that the bridge and parapet were in a defective condition, ought, 
in the exercise of reasonable care, to have introduced interim safety measures, 
or alternatively to have closed the bridge. The judge at first instance held that 
the death would have been prevented had the defender not breached its duty to 
deal with the defective parapets by implementing interim measures until the 
parapets were replaced. He found the defender wholly liable, rejecting its claim 
that the deceased had been contributorily negligent. The defender appealed 
against the decision at first instance. 
b) Judgment of the Court 
32 The Inner House of the Court of Session allowed the appeal in part. They held 
that (1) the standard of care which the defenders had been required to demon-
strate was not that of a professional structural engineer, but rather the ordinary 
negligence standard of reasonable care in the circumstances. The defenders had 
already identified the existence of the hazard; their subsequent decision to dis-
continue monitoring and not to implement interim measures could be judged 
according to the standard of common sense; (2) the defective parapet caused a 
significant risk of an accident of a type and severity that would not otherwise 
have arisen in the case of a careful road user. It was a manifest danger against 
which the defenders were bound to take preventative measures, but had failed 
to do so; and (3) while therefore the defenders were in breach of their duty of 
care, the judge at first instance had made an identifiable error in failing to take 
12 Martin Hogg 
account of the deceased’s negligence, which the appeal bench assessed as being 
at the level of 30% contributory negligence.  
c) Commentary 
33 The decision at first instance in this case was briefly referred to in the 2017 
Yearbook. That first instance decision had been an odd one: the judge, while 
correctly identifying that the defenders had been in breach of a duty of care 
owed to the deceased, had failed to take any account of his contributory negli-
gence. The judge had done so having reasoned as follows: 
‘As the deceased did not contribute in any way to the defective parapet and would 
not have lost his life had the parapet been operating as designed, in fact he would 
only have sustained minor injuries or none at all, I do not regard the deceased’s 
negligent driving as having contributed in any significant way to causing the harm. 
I am consequently of the opinion that there is no basis for any finding of contrib-
utory negligence on the part of the deceased and I therefore reject the defender’s 
case of contributory negligence.’26 
34 This was plainly erroneous causal reasoning. As the appeal bench rightly 
pointed out:  
‘Such an analysis is, however, misleading and incomplete. Of course, on the Lord 
Ordinary’s findings, had the parapet not been defective, the deceased would not 
have left the road and died. Equally, however, according to the same findings, had 
the deceased not driven negligently in the first place, thereby impacting the para-
pet, he would not have left the road and died. The reality, therefore, is that both 
elements had causative effect in the circumstances of the present case and one 
cannot be isolated from the other in arriving at a just and equitable outcome.’ 
35 The appeal bench correctly identified that (to frame the issue in causal terms) 
each of the driver’s negligence and the Council’s negligence were necessary 
conditions for the outcome, so that a set of causes minimally sufficient for that 
outcome was one which included the negligent conduct of each. Having cor-
rectly understood this point, the bench could proceed to an assessment of the 
contribution which the driver’s conduct made to the overall harm. Such assess-
ment was said to involve ‘both the blameworthiness of the parties and the causal 
potency of their acts’.27 In reaching its decision that the reclaimers (ie the Coun-
cil) were 70% responsible for the harm, the court emphasised that ‘the blame-
worthiness of the reclaimers is demonstrably far greater than that attributable 
 
26 Lord Mulholland. 
27 Opinion of the court, para 61, referencing the decision of the Supreme Court in Jackson v 
Murray [2015] UKSC 5, 2015 SC (UKSC) 105, 2015 SLT 151. 
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to the deceased upon the known facts’. Given the importance of the duties rest-
ing upon roads authorities, and the reliance placed on the fulfilment of such 
duties by the general public, this seems a reasonable assessment. 
5. Philp v Highland Council, Court of Session (Inner House) 
7 August 2018, [2018] CSIH 53): Whether Conduct of 
Harbourmaster amounted to Malicious Actings of Public 
Official in the Conduct of his Duties 
a) Brief Summary of the Facts 
36 The pursuer had been approached by a company which had offered him the 
opportunity of distributing fish feed to fish farms off the coast of Scotland. To 
enable the proposed arrangement to work, distribution of the feed would require 
to be undertaken from a suitable harbour. There were two candidate harbours, 
one of which (at Kyle) was favoured by the company and the pursuer because 
the pursuer already had a warehouse there. Trials were conducted at Kyle Har-
bour to test the feasibility of the plan. These trials involved the pursuer using a 
forklift truck. During the trials, the harbourmaster instructed the pursuer to 
cease using the forklift truck, claiming that he was not entitled to do so on the 
public highway without an appropriate licence. The pursuer refused to comply, 
claiming that the area of ground on which he was carrying out his operations 
did not form part of the harbour and that therefore the harbourmaster had no 
authority to issue the instructions he had. The harbourmaster subsequently con-
tacted the company and represented to it that the pursuer did not have an appro-
priate licence or insurance to undertake the operations, and that he would not 
allow the planned business operations to take place. This caused the trials to be 
delayed, allowing the operators of the other harbour to persuade the company 
to locate its business at its harbour. 
37 The pursuer raised an action against the defenders, who were the employer of 
the harbourmaster. He argued (1) that the obstruction of the trials by the har-
bourmaster was not made for any good reason: it was outwith the scope of his 
responsibilities and was ‘capricious and arbitrary in nature’. He argued that this 
conduct had deprived him of the chance of winning the business, and that the 
defenders were liable in damages for his loss; and (2) that the harbourmaster 
had subsequently obstructed an attempted sale of his business by the pursuer, 
and that by making a misrepresentation to a potential buyer this had resulted in 
the contract negotiations being unsuccessful. He again argued that the defenders 
were liable for this loss. 
38 At first instance, the trail judge found in favour of the defenders, holding that: 
(1) in relation to the alleged loss of his chance of winning the contract with the 
company, there was no assumption of responsibility on the defenders’ part in 
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respect of the pursuer’s pure economic loss. Further, she held that the defenders 
were not vicariously liable for the harbourmaster’s actions, as those actions 
were not sufficiently closely connected with his employment to found such vi-
carious liability; and (2) the pursuer had not pled a relevant case of misrepre-
sentation. The pursuer appealed against these findings. 
b) Judgment of the Court 
39 On appeal, the Inner House of the Court of Session allowed the appeal, and 
ordered a proof before answer (a trial of the facts, before a determination of the 
applicable law). The appeal bench held that: (1) the nature of the pursuer’s first 
claim was that of a claim of the alleged malicious actings of public officials 
and/or a public authority in the exercise of their duties (this being the Scottish 
equivalent of what in English law is called misfeasance in public office). The 
elements of the claim were (i) a deliberate misuse of statutory power, and (ii) 
malice. The appeal bench thought that the pursuer might be able to prove these 
elements at a trial of the facts; and (2) the nature of the pursuer’s second claim 
was the same as the first: malicious actings of public officials. Again, the appeal 
bench thought that the pursuer might be able to prove the necessary conduct at 
a trial of the facts.  
c) Commentary 
40 The approach of the judge at first instance in this case was heavily criticised by 
the appeal bench, who took the view that she had misunderstood the nature of 
the pursuer’s claim. One may have a degree of sympathy with the judge at first 
instance, however: the pursuer was a party litigant, and the appeal bench note 
in their judgment that his pleadings suffered from a number of major flaws, 
including the ‘failure to distinguish between vicarious responsibility for the ac-
tions of employees … and direct liability for malicious actings on the part of 
the defenders themselves, through their controlling mind’ and confusion ‘be-
tween liability for a delict, in the form of malicious actions by a public official, 
and quasi-delictual actings amounting to negligence’.28 So, the judge at first 
instance had not had an easy task deciphering the fundamental nature of the 
pursuer’s claims.  
41 The appeal bench judgment is of most interest in that it reminds us that the 
delictual claim of malicious actings of public officials and/or a public authority 
in the exercise of their duties is the equivalent of the English tort of misfeasance 
in public office. The genesis of the Scottish claim goes back to the early nine-
teenth century, and has its own body of native authority to which the courts 
look for guidance. In giving judgment in cases where the claim has been pled, 
 
28 See the Opinion of the Court at para 35. 
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the courts have spoken of public officials acting ‘maliciously and without prob-
able cause’29 and from ‘injurious and oppressive motives’.30 In the case at in-
stance, the pursuer was alleging that the harbourmaster’s actings had been mo-
tivated by an ulterior motive to see the alternative harbour benefited (illegally) 
by the business opportunity. If proven, this would seem to fit the requirement 
of improper motive set out in the relevant case law. 
42 A further point of more general note is a warning from the appeal bench about 
how judges ought to behave in the presence of party litigants. In his appeal, the 
pursuer had alleged that the judge at first instance had demonstrated ‘subcon-
scious bias’. The appeal bench did not believe there to be any substance to this 
allegation, but nonetheless felt moved to comment that: 
‘the pursuer’s criticisms do highlight the need for courts to be circumspect, espe-
cially in cases involving party litigants, when complimenting legal practitioners, 
their assistance to the court or diligence in preparation. Praise from the Bench, 
when merited, can be a deserved morale boost to the practitioner concerned. There 
is a place for it within the wider legal system. Whether, and to what degree, it 
should find its way into a judicial opinion is a more delicate question. 
Because of the potential effect it may have on the perception of the, often unsuc-
cessful, opposition, especially when that party’s forensic efforts have been met 
with opprobrium, it should certainly not feature as a matter of routine. It may be 
best to confine it to rare and exceptional cases’.31 
This exhortation to judges to avoid overly praising legal practitioners in the 
presence of an opposing party litigant shows commendable concern for ensur-
ing that justice is not just done but is seen to be done. 
6. Malone v Lord Advocate, Court of Session (Outer House) 
17 August 2018, [2018] CSOH 86, 2018 SLT 1129): 
Whether Lord Advocate was Vicariously Liable for 
Failure to Protect Employee of the Prosecution Service 
from Psychiatric Harm Suffered at Work 
a) Brief Summary of the Facts 
43 The pursuer was a former senior prosecutor with the Crown Office and Procu-
rator Fiscal Service (COPFS). She raised an action of damages (claiming 
 
29 Ballantyne v Glasgow Licensing Board 1986 SC 266. 
30 Dawson v Allardyce 18 February 1809, 15 Faculty Collection of Decisions (FC) 202 at 
203–4. 
31 See the Opinion of the court at para 42. 
16 Martin Hogg 
£ 1,300,000) against the Lord Advocate for psychiatric injury which she alleged 
was caused by her working conditions, specifically an unduly heavy burden of 
work. Her action alleged fault and negligence against the COPFS, for whom 
the Lord Advocate was said in her pleadings to be ‘vicariously responsible’. 
b) Judgment of the Court 
44 The Lord Ordinary (judge at first instance) ordered a proof before answer (a 
trial of the facts, before a determination of the applicable law). He held that: 
(1) the case as pled certainly did not read like a case of vicarious liability. Con-
fusion may have arisen because of a conflation of two separate sorts of circum-
stance: (i) delicts committed by servants or agents of the Crown, and (ii) breach 
of those duties which a person owes to his servants or agents at common law 
by reason of being their employer. As the pursuer was relying on a systemic 
failure on the part of the COPFS to address work overload, giving rise to breach 
of the employer’s primary duty of care, it was doubtful that the issue of vicari-
ous liability arose at all; (2) looking at the totality of the pursuer’s pleadings, 
enough had been averred to allow a proof before answer: if proved, the pur-
suer’s averments were capable of demonstrating that she had been required to 
perform duties in excess of those which she would have been entitled to expect, 
and that failure to address that situation created a foreseeable risk that the pur-
suer would suffer the kind of harm of which she complained. 
c) Commentary 
45 Claims by employees of being overworked are on the rise, especially in the 
public health service and the financial services sector. Many such claims are 
resolved without going to court, so this reported decision is worth noting. Some-
what badly drafted pleadings might have thwarted the pursuer’s claim in this 
case, but the judge was willing to overlook infelicities in drafting and allow the 
case to proceed to a trial of the facts. 
46 The poor drafting related to confusion as to the precise nature of the pursuer’s 
complaint: was she complaining about personally culpable conduct on the part 
of the Lord Advocate, for instance a failure on his part to address a specific 
workplace problem to which his attention had been drawn? Or was the com-
plaint alleging vicarious liability on his part (as a Crown Officer) for the delict 
of another crown servant? Or was the claim raised against the Lord Advocate 
as the pursuer’s employer, who would as such be potentially liable no matter 
who precisely within the COPFS had contributed to its alleged failings? The 
judge, having heard oral argument as to the nature of the pursuer’s complaint, 
formed the view that the substance of the claim was most likely of the third sort 
(hence not one complaining of any personal wrongdoing by the Lord Advocate 
or of vicarious liability on his part).  
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47 Given the lack of clarity in the written pleadings, the pursuer in this case was 
fortunate to be allowed a proof before answer. The decision should act as an 
incentive to those drafting pleadings concerning workplace delicts to think 
carefully about the nature of the alleged harm and thus of whom to sue and for 
what.  
7. Whitehouse v Gormley, Court of Session (Outer House) 
6 September 2018, [2018] CSOH 93: Whether Detention of 
the Administrator of a Football Club by the Police 
Amounted to a Delict 
a) Brief Summary of the Facts 
48 This action arose out of a 2012 criminal investigation into the acquisition of 
Glasgow Rangers Football Club in May 2011 and the subsequent financial man-
agement of the Club. The investigation followed a preliminary police examina-
tion of information passed to them in 2012 by the Club administrators. The 
pursuer, Mr Whitehouse, had been an administrator of Rangers Football Club 
until demitting office in October 2012. He was one of the individuals who were 
the subject of the police enquiries.  
49 At dawn on Friday 14 November 2014, the pursuer was detained at his home 
by officers from Police Scotland. He was informed that the basis for his deten-
tion was a ‘fraudulent scheme and attempt to pervert the course of justice’. He 
was taken to a police station in Glasgow where he was interviewed, arrested 
and charged. He was held in police custody until Monday 17 November 2014, 
when he appeared in Glasgow Sheriff Court. Requests for him to be released or 
liberated on an undertaking were declined, the police citing direction to that 
effect by the Crown. He was again arrested and held overnight in September 
2015, appearing at Glasgow Sheriff Court when he was committed for further 
examination and admitted to bail. Other suspects in the investigation were per-
mitted to attend the police station by arrangement. In June 2016, the Crown 
announced that no further action would be taken against the pursuer. 
50 The pursuer raised an action against (i) the Chief Constable of Police Scotland, 
(ii) the Procurator Fiscal For Specialist Casework in the Crown Office, and 
(iii) the Lord Advocate, seeking payment by them, jointly and severally or sev-
erally, of £ 9 million by way of damages for alleged wrongful detention, arrest 
and prosecution based on common law fault and breaches of arts 5 and 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). (The claims relating to the 
ECHR are not considered below.) The Lord Advocate claimed a Crown im-
munity from suit. It was the contention of the Chief Constable that, to succeed, 
any claim in respect of the conduct of the arresting police officers would require 
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to prove malice or an improper motive on their part; the pursuer however con-
tended that all that he required to show was that the police had acted outwith 
their competence. 
b) Judgment of the Court 
51 The judge (Lord Malcolm) held that: (1) the Lord Advocate enjoyed a common 
law immunity against civil suits, hence the common law claims against him 
were dismissed. This immunity had been settled in the case of Hester v Mac-
Donald.32 The position adopted in that decision regarding immunity from civil 
suit at common law remained good law, and was unaffected by the introduction 
of a separate remedial regime under the ECHR; (2) a proof before answer (a 
trial of the facts, before a determination of the law) would be allowed in relation 
to the claim against the Chief Constable. In relation to that claim, the pursuer 
would require to demonstrate malice and a want of probable cause on the part 
of the arresting police officers in order for his claim to succeed.  
c) Commentary 
52 This judgment concerns the common law wrong constituted by an unlawful 
deprivation of an individual’s liberty. The further aspects of the judgment - the 
common law immunity of the Lord Advocate from civil suit in general, and the 
ECHR dimensions of the case - though of far-reaching importance, are not an-
alysed below. 
53 The discussion of the law relating to the wrong of unlawful deprivation of lib-
erty occurs within the portion of the lengthy judgment concerning the claim by 
the pursuer against the police. Lord Malcolm prefaced his discussion of the rel-
evant law with a helpful preamble explaining why, in relation to that delict, 
public officials (including police officers) benefit from an immunity against 
suit. His opening remarks merit quoting here: 
‘Our law aims to provide appropriate protection to public officials who, when ex-
ercising their public duties, do something which, in terms of the constraints on 
their powers, they are not entitled to do. In particular they will not be liable in 
civil damages unless they acted without probable cause and were actuated by mal-
ice or some other improper motive. If matters are explained by an honest mistake, 
overzealousness, or the like, the necessary bad faith or deliberate abuse of power 
is absent. The policy is that public officials should be able to act in the public 
interest free of a concern that if they err, or overstep the mark, they will be subject 
to a civil suit from anyone harmed by their conduct. Claimants have attempted to 
exclude the protection, or privilege as it is sometimes called, by a submission that 
the official acted outwith or beyond his powers, and thus is in the same position 
as a private wrongdoer.’ 
 
32 1961 SC 370. 
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54 The existing case law concerning the immunity of police officers is difficult to 
reconcile and explain, especially in relation to whether malice is a necessary 
element of any claim. The cases for the most part consider malice to be a nec-
essary element of any claim, though they have differed on whether malice may 
need not be pled but may be inferred from the wrongful act, or whether it is 
necessary to aver facts and circumstances from which malice might be in-
ferred.33 Further uncertainty was created in the case of McKinney v Chief Con-
stable, Strathclyde Police,34 in which the judge preferred the view that, if an 
arrest is alleged to be ‘unlawful’ (which might be the case if the officer had 
simply made a mistake about the power to arrest), it must be justified by the 
officer as having been made for probable cause (malice is, on this approach, not 
a required element of a claim). By contrast, a more traditional view was taken 
in Woodward v Chief Constable, Fife Constabulary,35 in which it was said that 
the mere fact that an officer acted wrongfully to interfere with the liberty of an 
individual does not deprive the officer of immunity against civil suit (on this 
view, malice is a required element of a claim). 
55 Lord Malcolm engages in an extensive debate of the relative merits of the two 
positions, preferring that adopted in Woodward.36 He summarises matters this: 
‘the police should be able to discharge the duties of their office without being 
exposed to civil damages claims unless want of probable cause and malice are 
proved. Anything less, such as error, incompetence, or overzealousness, is not 
enough to set aside the privilege. And this remains so even if the error renders the 
conduct unlawful. It may be that sometimes judges have conflated malice and a 
lack of probable cause with conduct beyond the competence of the officer … but 
logically something more or different is required if the conduct is to be removed 
from the plea of privilege, perhaps conduct of a type which the law could never 
recognise as part of the officer’s authorised duties, even if the officer honestly 
thought otherwise. If one is not in that territory, the law does not impose civil 
liability upon a public officer who is carelessly but honestly pursuing his public 
duties.’ 
56 There is an interesting contrast here with English law. In England, the tort of 
false imprisonment is a tort of strict liability. Once an absence of lawful author-
ity to imprison someone is proven, it does not matter whether the imprisonment 
 
33 Lord Malcolm’s judgment at para 139.  
34 1998 Scots Law Times, Sheriff Court Reports (SLT (Sh Ct)) 80. 
35 1998 SLT 1342.  
36 See para 152. 
20 Martin Hogg 
was imposed in an honest but mistaken belief that it had a lawful basis.37 Nota-
bly, malice is not required.38 This might be said to suggest that English law 
places a higher value on the right to liberty than does Scot law. But, to look at 
it from the other side, it can also be said that Scots law has a higher regard for 
the protection of police officers who act honestly and in good faith in the dis-
charge of their duties. 
57 The judgment in this case is only at first instance, and this is unlikely to repre-
sent the final word of the Scottish courts on the issues raised. Nonetheless, 
given the detailed and close analysis of Lord Malcolm in his judgment, his 
views are likely to be treated with a great deal of respect. 
8. Personal Injury 
58 The majority of reported personal injury cases were, as in previous years, cases 
of road traffic accidents. In addition to the other sorts of case discussed below 
(or above), reported cases included that of a pedestrian tripping over a large 
stone on National Trust property,39 a nurse attacked by an autistic patient, 40 a 
beauty salon customer who had an allergic reaction to a treatment,41 and an 
employee falling on an uneven floor.42 Additionally, following the ground-
breaking decision reported last year of C v G,43 in which a civil damages award 
was made in respect of a rape, a further such claim was successfully brought in 
2018 (damages of £ 80,000 were awarded).44 
59 A couple of actions instituted by elected (or former) politicians in respect of 
defamation were reported in 2018. In McAnulty v McCulloch,45 a local council-
lor representing the Scottish National Party sued a fellow activist in relation to 
a statement made in an email sent by the activist which alleged that the coun-
cillor had made racist statements to the activist. The claim was successful, and 
the councillor was awarded damages of £ 40,000 for the damage to her reputa-
tion. Meanwhile, the ongoing saga related to a defamation action by former 
member of the Scottish Parliament, Tommy Sheridan, continued to occupy the 
 
37 On the requirements of the tort of false imprisonment in English law, see R ex parte Lumba 
v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 12, [2012] 1 AC 245.  
38 Weldon v Home Office [1990] 3 Weekly Law Reports (WLR) 465: ‘The intention 
necessary for commission of the tort is intentionally to do the act which causes the 
imprisonment. Added malice towards the imprisoned plaintiff is not necessary …’ (per 
Ralph Gibson LJ, at 470).  
39 McKevitt v National Trust for Scotland [2018] Reparation Law Reports (Rep LR) 76.  
40 Stark v Lothian NHS Board [2018] Sheriff Court Edinburgh (SC EDIN) 7.  
41 Grubb v Shannon 2018 SLT (Sh Ct) 193. 
42 Sloan v Lindvale Plastics [2018] SC EDIN 17.  
43 [2017] CSOH 5, 2017 SLT 79, discussed in E Karner/BC Steininger (eds), European Tort 
Law 2017 (2018) 527, nos 6–12. 
44 AR v Coxen 2018 SLT (Sh Ct) 335. 
45 [2018] CSOH 121. 
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courts, with a decision given by the Inner House of the Court of Session in 
Sheridan v News Group Newspapers Ltd46 that the pursuer was entitled to in-
terest on a sum of £ 200,000 awarded against the defenders from the date of the 
court’s decree until the date when the sum had been paid. The appeal court took 
the view that the judge at first instance had wrongly refused the award of inter-
est.  
60 Shopping centres can be dangerous places. In Beaton v Ocean Terminal Ltd,47 
the pursuer slipped at the defenders’ shopping centre, fracturing her ankle. The 
pursuer claimed damages of £ 16,000 but was unsuccessful in that claim. She 
had slipped on a sign warning that the floor was wet. The bright yellow plastic 
sign, though designed in normal conditions to be placed upright, had been 
folded in half and placed flat on the floor. The pursuer failed to notice it, stepped 
on it and slipped. Her claim failed because the judge held that, in placing the 
bright yellow sign on the floor, the defenders had exercised reasonable care; in 
other words, they had not breached the duty of care incumbent upon them. 
61 As every year, a number of cases of liability for asbestos-related injuries came 
before the courts. One such was Thacker v North British Steel Group,48 in which 
damages were awarded to the widow and family of an employee of the defend-
ers who had died from mesothelioma contracted at work. The total quantum of 
damages had been agreed by the parties at £ 360,000. This figure is comparable 
to that of approximately £ 340,000 awarded in a 2017 case.49 
62 As also every year, the courts dealt with claims relating to childhood abuse. In 
A and B v C,50 two women (who were cousins) claimed damages in respect of 
the sexual abuse they had suffered as children at the hands of a man who was 
the step-father of the first woman. The court awarded the step-daughter dam-
ages totalling £ 167,000, and the second woman £ 33,000 (the overall duration 
and frequency of abuse in the second case had been less). In the case of the first 
woman, £ 90,000 was awarded as solatium (for the pain and suffering she had 
experienced and would experience in the future); £ 10,000 for loss of earnings, 
both past and future (she had been unable to work at various times because of 
the trauma she experienced, requiring treatment for this); and £ 5,000 for med-
ical expenses for cognitive behavioural therapy. 
 
46 [2018] CSIH 76. 
47 [2018] CSOH 74, 2018 Rep LR 110. 
48 [2018] CSOH 73, 2018 SLT 799. 
49 Manson v Henry Robb Ltd [2017] CSOH 126. 
50 [2018] CSOH 65. 
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C. Literature 
1. Gordon Cameron, Delict (5th edn 2018), LawBasics series 
63 This is the fifth edition of a popular student primer on the law of delict. The 
book is popular with students when preparing for examinations in introductory 
courses to delict, as it seeks to cover the entire subject in a readable and acces-
sible manner. 
2. James Bailey, Aggravated Damages or Additional Awards 
of Solatium, Edinburgh Law Review 22(1), 2018, 29–54 
64 In this article the author undertakes an examination of whether the category of 
‘aggravated damages’ utilised in English law has an equivalent in Scots law (in 
one recent Scottish case, Adebayo Aina v Secretary of State for the Home De-
partment51 it was suggested by the judge that there was no barrier to their recog-
nition in Scotland). The author explores the idea that the existing category of 
solatium (compensation for pain and suffering) might be capable of performing 
the same function as aggravated damages, as it is an award designed to reflect, 
in each case, the degree of suffering experienced by a pursuer. The author cites 
a number of defamation cases in which it is argued that aggravating factors have 
been reflected in increased awards of solatium. The author prefers this approach 
to the separate category of aggravated damages used by English law, arguing 
that ‘[i]t prevents such awards being mistaken for punitive damages, it avoids 
the need for the courts to make artificial and arbitrary distinctions when grant-
ing awards and it helps to promote a coherent, unified approach to the availa-
bility of damages for mental distress’.52 The author makes out a compelling 
case as to why Scots law should not adopt the approach of English law in this 
area. 
3. Bobby Lindsay, Fostering in a New Age of Vicarious 
Liability? Edinburgh Law Review 22(2) 2018, 294–301 
65 The author examines the United Kingdom Supreme Court’s decision in Armes 
v Nottinghamshire Council53 (concerning the vicarious tortious liability of a 
local authority for child abuse committed by foster parents) and considers 
whether the approach taken would be likely to be followed by the Scottish 
courts. The author’s view is that, given the processes attendant upon the foster-
ing of children in Scotland (where ‘carers are not independent care-providers 
 
51 [2016] CSOH 143. 
52 At 54. 
53 [2017] UKSC 60, [2017] 3 WLR 1000. 
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for individual placements, but an integrated part of the local authority’s care-
provision service’54), the same rationale for the imposition of vicarious liability 
would be applicable. 
4. Lesley-Anne Barnes Macfarlane, Rethinking childhood 
contributory negligence: ‘blame’, ‘fault’ – but what about 
children’s rights? Juridical Review 2018, 75–97 
66 The author examines the law of contributory negligence in Scotland as it relates 
to children. She argues that, while in many areas of domestic law, the child’s 
best interests are discernible as a consideration when decisions are made that 
have an impact on children, those interests are not recognised as being of pri-
mary, or indeed of any, consequence in determinations about childhood con-
tributory negligence. She further argues that judgments about the contributory 
negligence of the young often indicate inconsistent, and unpredictable, ap-
proaches and outcomes concerning children. 
67 The author considers a number of options for reform of the law, practice and 
policy (including a Children’s Civil Injuries Compensation Scheme) that she 
argues would render the way the legal systems in the UK address the contribu-
tory negligence of children more compliant with art 3 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. The author’s argument is an interesting 
one, although other perspectives are also possible. For instance, an alternative 
view might be that contributory negligence findings can assist in developing in 
children a sense of responsibility for the consequences of their actions and that 
this could be said to be in their ‘best interests’. Additionally, it might be ques-
tioned why, simply because a claimant is a child, a child-centred ‘best interests’ 
enquiry should trump the wider interest of the law of delict in achieving an 
even-handed assessment of responsibility for harm.  
5. Eleanor J Russell, The liability of roads authorities 
revisited, Juridical Review 2018, 283–291 
68 The author examines the state of the law in relation to the liability of roads 
authorities for dangerous roads in the light of three recent cases (including 
Bowes v Highland Council, discussed above55). She contrasts the Scottish ap-
proach to this issue (which imposes common law liability on roads authorities) 
with the English approach (which does not). She argues that the recent case law 
draws attention to the importance of two matters for injured parties: (1) the need 
for pleadings from which the existence of a hazard can be inferred; and (2) the 
 
54 At 300. 
55 At no 30 above (CSIH, 5 June 2018, [2018] CSIH 38, 2018 SC 499, 2018 SLT 757). 
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need for a secure foundation in the evidence of what a reasonable roads author-
ity would have done in the same circumstances. 
